Will Péter Magyar bring Hungary “back to Europe”?

Hello! Today is 20 April, and here is your EU news summary for the week. Feel free to share this newsletter with friends and colleagues, and follow us on LinkedIn.

This week’s expert is Juraj Majcin, from the European Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels. Juraj is a policy analyst focusing on European and transatlantic security and defence, the defence industry and innovation. His analysis has been featured in international outlets including Euractiv, Newsweek, Reuters, CNN, and Sky News. He is from Slovakia.

Péter Magyar’s victory in Hungary’s 2026 general election has brought Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule to an end and opened a window for Hungary to return as a predictable, rules-based partner after years of tension with Brussels and a toxic rapprochement with Moscow. But while expectations are high in Brussels, the reality is more nuanced.

Russia: strategic rupture, economic continuity

Russia has effectively lost its most important political ally inside the EU. For years, Budapest was not simply a dissenting voice but a government that systematically undermined EU foreign and security policy from within, often subservient to Moscow’s interests.

This dynamic was clearly illustrated by recent leaks revealing close coordination between Hungary’s foreign minister, Péter Szijjártó, and his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov. According to these disclosures, Szijjártó shared sensitive documents with Moscow and even acted proactively to secure the removal of certain Russian nationals from the EU sanctions list.

Magyar has pledged to investigate these ties and to decisively break with Russia politically. His campaign message, “Russians go home” , signalled a clear departure from Orbán’s approach. He has also committed to restoring Hungary as a trusted partner within both the EU and NATO.

Hungary’s repositioning may now enable the EU to move forward with tougher measures, including restrictions on companies servicing Russian oil exports under the 20th sanctions package, which remains blocked due to vetoes from Hungary and Slovakia.

At a time when global willingness to abandon Russian oil and gas has weakened, driven in part by turmoil in the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, this matters strategically, particularly as resistance to such imports has eroded across parts of the Global South.

Yet the break with Moscow is not absolute on the economic level. Magyar has indicated that Hungary will pursue a diversified energy strategy, including imports of Russian oil and gas. It is also highly unlikely that Budapest will abandon its long-standing nuclear cooperation with Rosatom, including the expansion of the Paks nuclear power plant.

This can bring Magyar’s government into conflict with the new REPowerEU Regulation, which establishes a binding EU‑wide phase‑out of imports of Russian natural gas, and is accompanied by political commitments and forthcoming legislation to phase out Russian oil and reduce dependence on Russian nuclear fuel. .

Ukraine: less obstruction, limited support

If Russia has lost a partner in Budapest, Ukraine has not necessarily gained one.

Magyar’s victory could help unlock the proposed €90 billion EU loan for Ukraine and release more than €6 billion in European Peace Facility reimbursements for Member States that had supplied military assistance to Kyiv. Hungary is therefore likely to become a more constructive and less disruptive actor within EU decision-making on Ukraine.

However, this should not be mistaken for a pro-Ukrainian shift. Magyar is expected to maintain a cautious stance with no direct military support, and continued emphasis on national interests.

Hungary is also unlikely to become a strong advocate of Ukraine’s EU membership. Concerns over the rights of the Hungarian minority in western Ukraine remain politically salient, and Magyar’s base continues to reflect these sensitivities.

Rule of law: Ambition meets structural constraints

The rule-of-law question remains central to Hungary’s relationship with the EU. Due to longstanding concerns, Brussels has frozen nearly €17 billion in EU funds, much of it conditional on reforms related to judicial independence, corruption, asylum rights, and academic freedom.

Magyar has pledged to rebuild democratic institutions, strengthen checks and balances, and restore judicial independence. Plans include constitutional reforms, the introduction of term limits for prime ministers, and the establishment of a national asset recovery office tasked with investigating past corruption and reclaiming illegally obtained assets. He has also committed to restoring media freedom and dismantling state propaganda structures.

Yet implementation will be difficult. The deeply entrenched system of political and economic control built under Orbán is embedded across business, media, and state institutions. Dismantling it will require substantial institutional reforms and strong political backing.

There are also early signs of potential tension. In his victory speech, Magyar called on senior officials, including the president and prosecutor general, to resign, suggesting he would otherwise remove them. While politically understandable, such moves raise questions about his attitude to constitutional boundaries.

Similarly, his warnings toward public broadcasters, threatening to suspend their news programming, unless they are “cleansed of propaganda”, could lead to reforms that themselves test the principles of free media.

A key test will be whether Magyar reforms Hungary’s electoral system, which has long favoured dominant parties and helped entrench Orbán’s increasingly authoritarian rule. Ironically, it is the same system that enabled Magyar’s own rise to power.

What next?

Magyar and his cabinet are expected to take office at the beginning of May.

Magyar’s future government have already met senior EU officials in Budapest to discuss how to fast-track the restoration of Hungary’s access to blocked EU funds. Strong early action can be expected on this front, as unlocking those resources was one of Magyar’s central campaign promises.

His choice of first foreign destinations is equally telling. Magyar has said he will travel first to Warsaw and Brussels, a deliberate signal that Hungary is seeking to repair relations not only with the EU but also Poland after years of damage caused by Orbán’s rapprochement with Moscow.

ENERGY • The closure of the Strait of Hormuz since 28 February 2026 has triggered an unprecedented jet fuel crisis in Europe, whose stocks are heavily dependent on the Middle East.

The International Energy Agency warned that the continent had no more than six weeks of kerosene remaining, while prices have more than doubled since the start of the conflict.

The European Commission is expected to present this week an emergency package: enhanced stock monitoring, the creation of a dedicated observatory, and a jet fuel sharing mechanism between member states, modelled on the Covid-19 vaccine scheme.

These measures were announced by EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen.

In parallel, the European Commission launched on 13 April a consultation with member states on a draft temporary State aid framework, in response to the energy crisis triggered by the war in the Middle East.

The proposed scheme primarily targets the most exposed sectors — agriculture, fisheries, road transport and short sea shipping — facing sharp increases in fuel and fertiliser costs.

IMF • Europe should respond to the new energy shock with disciplined fiscal policy that protects the vulnerable while preserving market signals and fiscal rules, according to the IMF.

During its spring meeting, the IMF urged highly indebted EU countries not to widen deficits, while countries with more space must still prioritize consolidation given pressures from defence, ageing and the green transition.

The ECB’s Christine Lagarde said : “Any fiscal responses to the energy price shock should be temporary, targeted and tailored”, as headline inflation rose to 2.6% in March from 1.9% in February due to an increase in energy prices.

IMF analysis shows that broad energy support is both costly and regressive, with European governments in 2022 spending on average 2.5 percent of GDP on largely untargeted measures that mainly benefited higher‑income, high‑consumption households, even though fully compensating the bottom 40 percent for the entire energy price increase would have required only 0.9 percent of GDP.

In parallel, the IMF supports Europe doubling down on its energy union and Green Deal (completing the single energy market, maintaining the ETS, and accelerating grid interconnections) to lower structural energy costs and reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels.

• Bruegel published a working paper on the EU’s persistent current account surplus, arguing it reflects structurally weak investment and calling for capital markets integration and fiscal-rule reform to revive it.