What the EU Pact on Asylum & Migration Is About

Hello! Today is 13 April, and here is your EU news summary for the week. Feel free to share this newsletter with friends and colleagues, and follow us on LinkedIn.

This week’s expert is Monique Pariat, Migration Adviser at the Jacques Delors Institute. She previously served at the European Commission, where she was Director‑General for Migration and Home Affairs, overseeing work on the Pact on Migration and Asylum as well as the EU’s border and external security policies. She has published a policy brief on the Asylum and Migration Pact for the Jacques Delors Institute.

Adopted in May 2024 after three years of painstaking negotiations, the European Pact on Migration and Asylum will enter into force in June 2026. With only a few weeks to go, it is time to take stock.

Key Features

Before the Pact, the European asylum system placed the main responsibility for processing asylum applications in countries of first entry (such as Italy or Greece), under the so‑called Dublin Regulation. The lack of solidarity and harmonised procedures became glaringly apparent during the successive migration crises Europe faced.

The Pact is built around four pillars:

• Faster procedures at the EU’s external borders
• More robust asylum and return processes
• A system of mandatory solidarity among Member States
• Strengthened cooperation with third countries

Among its most notable innovations are the introduction of a systematic pre‑entry screening phase at the border (seven days to carry out mandatory checks), a fast‑track procedure limited to 12 weeks for applicants from countries with a low EU‑wide recognition rate (of below 20%), and a parallel accelerated return procedure within the same time limit.

In exchange, a mandatory solidarity mechanism is established, providing for at least 30,000 annual relocations and €600 million in financial contributions. The Dublin rules remain in force but have been revised to prevent secondary movements, while a set of substantial safeguards ensures respect for fundamental rights throughout the process.

Developments Since Adoption

Persistent difficulties in executing return decisions — fewer than 30% are effectively enforced — together with the rise of anti‑migration sentiment across Europe, have led to a general tightening of migration policies.

The von der Leyen Commission quickly complemented the Pact with three legislative initiatives:

• A proposal to harmonise and accelerate return procedures (March 2025), including the possible establishment of return platforms in third countries that comply with international law;
• A revision of the asylum procedures regulation, creating an EU‑wide list of safe countries of origin (April 2025);
• A redefinition of the “safe third country” concept, allowing Member States to declare an asylum request inadmissible when the applicant could have received protection in a safe transit country.

In December 2025, the Council and the European Parliament reached an agreement on the latter two texts. While not formally part of the Pact itself, they complement its overall architecture.

State of Play

In its June 2025 communication, the Commission reported that 26 Member States had engaged in regular exchanges with the institution, and 25 had submitted national implementation plans.

Two exceptions stand out: Poland, which submitted only a partial note while maintaining its opposition to the solidarity mechanism, and Hungary, which refused any engagement altogether.

Only three countries — the Czech Republic, Estonia, and the Netherlands — have finalised draft national legislation for implementation.

More worryingly, Member States’ efforts appear focused on meeting the bare minimum requirements for compliance, with little effort to address the structural weaknesses of national reception systems.

The first Annual Report on Migration and Asylum, published in November 2025, highlighted persisting challenges, including delays in upgrading Eurodac (the database containing asylum seekers’ fingerprints) and incomplete arrangements to ensure monitoring of fundamental rights.

Adoption of the Annual Solidarity Pool

The adoption of the Annual Solidarity Pool was the key test of Member States’ political will. This mechanism organises yearly assistance among them, in the form of relocations, operational support, or financial aid.

The process proved particularly delicate, amid a political climate hostile to relocation commitments and deep divisions over the treatment of Ukrainian refugees. Adopted by the Council on 18 December 2025, the Pool was ultimately set at 21,000 relocations and €420 million in funding — figures adjusted to reflect only half a year of implementation in 2026. Four countries — Greece, Cyprus, Spain, and Italy — were officially recognised as being under migratory pressure.

It is also worth noting that fewer than half of the relocation slots were covered by firm commitments, and two Member States made none at all. Despite these shortfalls, the Pool’s final adoption remains an encouraging signal.

Challenges Ahead

Significant progress has undeniably been made, yet several critical issues remain unresolved. The success of border procedures will depend on Member States’ ability to create the required 30,000 places and, above all, to ensure that return decisions are actually enforced.

Upgrading Eurodac remains an essential technical prerequisite. Reluctance from certain Member States, most notably Hungary, continues to undermine the coherence of the overall framework. The Commission will have to fully assume its role as guardian of the Treaties, including through infringement procedures if necessary. Finally, the EU’s heavy reliance on third countries for returns calls for balanced and credible partnership agreements.

It would be unrealistic to expect full operational readiness by June 2026. Yet, the 26% decrease in irregular border crossings in 2025, improved border‑management IT systems, and the prospect of an €81 billion migration budget for 2028–2034 nonetheless justify a measure of cautious optimism.

HUNGARY • Péter Magyar has secured a decisive victory in Hungary’s parliamentary election, ending Viktor Orbán’s 16‑year hold on power. His opposition party Tisza won roughly 138 of the 199 seats in Parliament, giving it the two‑thirds majority needed to amend the Constitution and dismantle Fidesz’s entrenched control over the judiciary, state bodies, and educational and cultural institutions.

This sweeping mandate allows Magyar to unravel key pillars of Orbán’s illiberal democracy, including the prime minister’s grip on the courts, state‑owned companies and the media.

He has called for top‑level resignations in the supreme court, the judicial council, the state audit office, the competition authority and the media authority, and pledged to restore Hungary as a strong ally within the EU and NATO.

Magyar has also committed to full cooperation with the EU to release €18 billion in frozen EU funds linked to rule‑of‑law concerns and to back the EU’s planned €90 billion loan to Ukraine.

Voters turned against Fidesz amid weak economic performance, with Hungary recording almost no growth over three years and the highest cumulative inflation in the EU since 2022.

ENERGY • European governments are locked in tense talks with the Commission over how far they can go to shield households and firms from soaring energy prices triggered by the Iran war, the Financial Times reports.

Several states, including Italy, Poland and Spain, have already cut fuel taxes, while Rome pushes for a temporary suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact and an EU‑wide windfall tax on energy profits.

The Commission urges strictly “temporary and targeted” measures, warning that generous subsidies or tax cuts could ignite a new fiscal crisis and bolster inflation after Covid and Ukraine. ECB President Christine Lagarde also insisted that open‑ended support would fuel inflation and strain already‑high public debts.

Economy commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis insists conditions for triggering the pact’s “escape clause” are not met. The escape clause requires a severe economic downturn to occur.

CRITICAL MINERALS • The EU and US are moving towards an agreement on critical minerals that would align how they produce and secure key raw materials, with the goal of reducing reliance on Chinese‑centred supply chains.

Draft texts seen by Bloomberg describe incentives to support non‑Chinese producers, cooperation across the entire life cycle of critical minerals — from mining to recycling — and joint instruments such as stockpiling, coordinated public procurement and crisis‑response mechanisms, open to other “like‑minded” partners.

The push is driven by concerns over China’s export controls and dominant processing role, and could become a blueprint for broader multi‑country arrangements. China has progressively tightened controls on critical mineral exports since 2023, turning them into a key lever in its trade and security policy.

• In an ECIPE brief, Fredrik Erixon and Dyuti Pandya contend that the Digital Markets Act is no longer simply policing anti-competitive conduct but is increasingly redesigning digital markets in ways that may not be aligned with current technological realities.
• In a policy brief for the European Council on Foreign Relations, Nicu Popescu and Alan Riley argue that Europe can stay competitive in the AI race only if it launches a “fast energy” programme to deliver abundant electricity at speed, since AI is becoming constrained above all by power supply rather than just chips or algorithms.