Merger Control: Evolution or Revolution

Hello! Today is May 11, and here is your EU news summary for the week. Feel free to share this newsletter with friends and colleagues, and follow us on LinkedIn.

This week’s expert is Thomas Harbor. Thomas is a Brussels-based attorney specializing in competition law. He is also an adjunct lecturer in economic policy at Sciences Po in Paris and the cofounder of What’s up EU. He authored a longer piece on today’s topic for Institut Montaigne.

On 30 April 2026, the European Commission published its draft new merger control guidelines, which are open for consultation until 26 June. As the most ambitious overhaul of competition law in twenty years, it will likely amount to more of an evolution — albeit an important one — than a revolution.

Why revise the guidelines?

The merger control guidelines set out the framework within which the Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition analyses concentrations subject to its prior review. In practice, they bind the Commission and guide national competition authorities.

The guidelines are an instrument of “soft law”. They are adopted by the Commission, without the Parliament or the Council, following extensive consultations. The draft guidelines proposed last week revise and replace two texts dating from 2004, on horizontal mergers, and 2008, on so-called non-horizontal mergers.

The call for reform is often traced back to the prohibition of the Alstom/Siemens merger in 2019. In response to that casus belli, Paris and Berlin argued for more flexible rules and greater consideration of global competition; others warned against the politicisation of competition law.

These divisions did not begin in 2019, and they have not disappeared. But the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and economic competition from China and the United States have since heightened the sense of urgency around Europe’s economic decline. The Draghi report laid the foundations for the revision now being pursued by the current Commission.

Evolution or revolution?

Some will welcome a new European language that is more favourable to consolidation. Mergers and acquisitions that allow companies to reach the critical scale needed to invest and compete are recognised as having potential benefits for the internal market.

The draft guidelines introduce a broader approach, less focused on prices; a more dynamic approach, centred on “competitive potential”; and greater attention to innovation and efficiency gains generated by mergers. The benefits of a transaction for consumers are expanded to include new criteria such as resilience and environmental sustainability.

But the reform is not one-way. The Commission is also updating its toolkit to intervene in new areas: portfolio effects, involving the combination of complementary product ranges; labour markets, including the risk of monopsony; access to private data, including the entrenchment of dominant positions, particularly in digital markets; and algorithmic collusion, involving automated coordination through pricing tools, are all addressed in the draft guidelines.

Political support for the creation of European champions will not lead to blank cheques from the Commission. The fundamental objectives of competition law are not changing in any fundamental way.

What next?

The Commission is certainly opening up new avenues for companies to demonstrate that a transaction ultimately benefits the internal market, but only well-supported cases will succeed. More fundamentally, the text reflects an attempt to give concrete effect to the Draghi and Letta reports without abandoning the protection of consumers and free competition. Its impact will be determined by decisional practice in the coming years. The final text is expected to be adopted by the end of 2026.

Last week, the European Commission unveiled its draft new merger control guidelines, which are open for consultation until 26 June. The first major overhaul of competition law in twenty years, the text paves the way for an approach more favourable to European industrial consolidation, while expanding the Commission’s toolkit into new areas.

TARIFFS • On 1 May, Washington threatened to raise tariffs on European vehicles from 15% to 25%, accusing Brussels of failing to implement the summer 2025 Turnberry trade deal. After a call with Ursula von der Leyen, Donald Trump set a deadline: ratify the deal by 4 July or face tariffs going “much higher”.

Germany bears the brunt of Europe’s exposure. Its trade surplus with the United States stood at €69.9 billion, driven by automotive, mechanical engineering and chemicals — the sectors directly targeted by the new tariff schedule.

The Commission is maintaining a negotiating stance, while keeping open the option of counter-measures on €72 billion worth of American goods. The European Parliament has yet to ratify the deal, which remains the main sticking point with Washington. Trade talks between the two blocs are expected to resume in the coming weeks.

ENERGY CRISIS • As the closure of the Strait of Hormuz pushes European energy prices to new highs, governments are reaching for the same playbook as in 2022. The IMF is blunt: during the last energy crisis, two-thirds of EU fiscal support — averaging 2.5% of GDP — was untargeted. Protecting just the bottom 40% of households would have cost less than half that (0.9% of GDP).

The IMF and ECB warn that blanket measures distort price signals, discourage energy efficiency, and prove politically hard to roll back — a dangerous combination when public debt is already stretched.

The Bruegel 2026 Fiscal Response Tracker shows history repeating. EU governments have already committed over €11 billion, with more than 72% in untargeted measures such as blanket VAT or excise cuts. Spain alone accounts for nearly half the total (€5bn); Germany follows at €1.6bn. Only four countries have introduced measures specifically for vulnerable households.

• In an Atlantic Council dispatch, Stuart Jones and Ignacio Albe contend that the provisional implementation of the EU-Mercosur agreement is an important milestone, strengthening Europe’s access to South American raw materials while giving Mercosur countries broader market access and lower import costs.
• In a CSIS commentary, Federico Steinberg explains how the EU has positioned itself as a stabilising hub in a fragmented global trade order, using single-market integration and new bilateral agreements to reduce exposure to US protectionism and Chinese coercion.