Ukraine’s membership bid is unprecedented: never before has a country applied to join the European Union while under attack from a neighbouring power.
This dramatic context, with far‑reaching geopolitical implications for the Union, explains the equally exceptional speed of the initial stages of Ukraine’s accession process.
Could the next steps move just as fast? Is the EU on the verge of inventing a new accession model that would redefine the very notion of Member State?
When President Zelensky first floated the idea of a “fast track” in 2022, it sounded like wishful thinking. But speculation has been growing since the idea of membership as early as 2027 appeared in some draft peace‑plan scenarios for Ukraine.
Conditionality and Merit
The EU’s accession process, particularly since the enlargements to Central and Eastern Europe, is grounded in conditionality and merit, measured against the so‑called Copenhagen criteria.
A candidate’s ability to meet these benchmarks — democracy and the rule of law, a viable and competitive market economy, and adoption of the EU acquis — determines the pace of accession.
But everything also depends on whether all the Member States consider a new enlargement opportune and compatible with preserving the “momentum of European integration”.
The early steps are political signals with largely symbolic impact. Ukraine obtained candidate status in less than four months and the formal opening of accession talks in under two years. By comparison, the Western Balkan countries needed between 2 and 6 years, and between 3.5 and 18 years respectively, to clear these hurdles.
This speed is understandable given the wartime context. The process, however, becomes more demanding once negotiations are opened. While talks with Finland, already highly aligned with the EU, lasted only 14 months, they stretched to around five years for the Central and Eastern Europeans.
Adding at least one year for finalising and ratifying the accession treaty, if Ukraine were to follow their pace, its accession would take place, at best, in early 2030.
The Unprecedented Prospect of Fast-Track Accession
“Fast‑track” accession by 2027 would therefore mean admitting a country clearly not yet compliant with the Copenhagen criteria and granting it Member State status subject to numerous limitations.
While the Treaties do not formally provide for multiple membership statuses within the EU, practice has established a fairly variable geometry in Member States’ rights and obligations: the euro area, Schengen, and a range of opt‑outs.
Accession treaties can also amend the founding treaties, temporarily or permanently. It is therefore entirely conceivable, in Ukraine’s case, that the formal act of joining the EU would not mark the end but rather the beginning of a long process of alignment with EU law.
In other words, whereas transitional periods and derogations have so far been the exception, they could become the rule.
Yet even if such an approach is legally possible, is it realistic or desirable? Using the terms “accession” or “Member State” for a situation far removed from what those words have meant up to now would risk cementing the idea that some states have become “second‑class” members.
More seriously, it would mean sacrificing the logic of merit and conditionality — in other words, giving up what is most valuable about enlargement: its transformative nature. It would also make the EU’s structure and functioning even more complex.
It would raise questions for other candidates too. If this new approach were reserved solely for Ukraine, would such double standards not deal a fatal blow to the EU’s credibility? And in any case, could such an accession realistically secure the 27 required ratifications, especially in France, where it might trigger a referendum?
Gradual Accession: A More Credible Path?
Geopolitical imperatives and solidarity push the EU to respond to Ukraine’s European aspirations as quickly as possible. But rather than a fast‑track accession that would be largely artificial and structurally destabilising, gradual accession that offers a better way forward.
Full membership would remain a medium‑term prospect, subject to strict conditionality and rigorous compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. Upstream, however, each candidate country, according to its own merits, should gradually gain access to benefits in principle reserved for members, whether participation in institutions, integration into common policies, or access to EU funds — far beyond what has previously been offered to candidates.
And for the sake of clarity, rather than inventing a status that is a membership in name only, a new intermediate status should be created, granting — on a temporary basis — rights that are less than those of full members but significantly greater than those traditionally enjoyed by candidates.