The Franco-German Future Combat Air System (FCAS) was meant to be the embodiment of European strategic autonomy, a next-generation fighter, drones, sensors and combat cloud that would replace the Rafale and Eurofighter and prove that Europe could build its most complex military systems without the United States.
Its failure shows that Russia’s war against Ukraine has not erased Europe’s old defence divisions. However, the wrong lesson would be to conclude that deeper defence-industrial cooperation is impossible. The project proves that cooperation built around prestige platforms, unclear leadership and incompatible national requirements is unlikely to deliver.
A fighter jet promised for the 2040s will not deter Russia in 2026. Europe needs a more pragmatic approach focused on expanding its defence-industrial capacity for high-intensity warfare, rather than investing in another generation of big-ticket prestige projects.
Lesson 1: Weapons systems are political projects first
Major weapons systems are never just engineering projects. They express national strategy, military culture, industrial power and sovereignty.
France entered FCAS as a nuclear power with an ambition, however constrained, for global military reach. Paris did not see the project simply as an air-superiority fighter. It also needed a platform linked to nuclear delivery, aircraft-carrier operations and export potential. These requirements were connected to France’s nuclear deterrent, its carrier-based aviation, its global military posture and the central role of Dassault in French defence sovereignty.
Germany approached the programme differently. Berlin did not need the same aircraft. Its nuclear role within NATO is tied to US nuclear sharing and the F-35, not to a sovereign French-style nuclear-capable and carrier-capable fighter. Germany’s priorities were closer to NATO air operations, support for land forces and securing a substantial industrial role for Airbus and German suppliers. France and Dassault, however, were reluctant to dilute design authority or share the most sensitive technologies on equal terms.
This created a contradiction at the heart of the programme. FCAS was presented as a European project, but the companies and governments involved remained structured around national priorities, national champions and national definitions of sovereignty. Making a programme “European” does not automatically create a European industrial culture. More often, it creates a more complicated negotiation between national industries, each backed by its own government, each trying to protect jobs, intellectual property, design authority and future exports.
Lesson 2: Europe needs less symbolism and more delivery
The main European security challenge is not the absence of a symbolic sixth-generation fighter. It is the shortage of capabilities that can strengthen deterrence now.
Rather than concentrating political energy and money on flagship platforms that may enter service only in the 2040s, Europe should focus on urgent needs that can be met within the next five years.
This requires a break with the old procurement pattern. Too much European defence spending still flows through national channels, often through direct awards to favoured domestic suppliers. As Andrius Kubilius (the EU’s first Commissioner for Defence and Space) has warned, European governments still award around 80 per cent of defence procurement through direct contracts under Article 346 TFEU, reinforcing national fragmentation instead of building a genuinely competitive European defence market.
The objective should be more open, competitive and coordinated procurement across borders. Joint purchasing should become the norm for systems that already exist, rather than the exception.
Governments also need to provide multi-year orders, clearer funding commitments and support not only for prime contractors but also for the suppliers where many bottlenecks sit — notably engines, electronics, sensors, chips, propellants, energetics, machine tools and specialised components.
What comes next?
The next likely test is the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS), the Franco-German project intended to replace the Leopard 2 and Leclerc tanks. MGCS is still formally alive, but it is already repeating the FCAS pattern: Franco-German rivalry, industrial workshare disputes, different military priorities and timelines that stretch far beyond Europe’s immediate security needs. The strain is now serious enough that Rheinmetall’s CEO has warned a French exit ‘cannot be ruled out’, as Paris is considering sharp funding cuts to the programme.
The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) looks more promising — but only comparatively. The UK, Italy and Japan have so far avoided the worst Franco-German traps. GCAP has fewer partners, clearer momentum and a stronger industrial structure. But it is not immune to the same risks. The UK’s fiscal room is limited, and the possible entry of new partners — including Germany — could bring additional money and industrial capacity, but also new workshare politics.
A more positive example is KNDS. Ahead of its planned dual listing in Paris and Frankfurt, Germany is moving to acquire a 40 per cent stake in the Franco-German land-systems group, matching France’s planned 40 per cent holding and giving both governments equal control over a company that produces the Leopard 2 and Leclerc tanks. This is still state-driven industrial policy, but it points to a more practical model of European defence cooperation — consolidated around existing production capacity, rather than relying only on distant prestige projects.